The Geopolitics of Turkey
STRATFOR
First reported: July 31, 2007 17 58 GMTAugust 05, 2007 Sunday
By George Friedman
Rumors are floating in Washington and elsewhere that Turkey is
preparing to move against the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK), an
anti-Turkish group seeking an independent Kurdistan in Turkey. One
report, by Robert Novak inthe Washington Post, says the United States
is planning to _collaborate_
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with Turkey in suppressing the PKK in northern Iraq, an area the PKK
has used as a safe-haven and launch pad to carry out attacks in
Turkey.
The broader issue is not the PKK, but Kurdish independence. The Kurds
are a distinct ethnic group divided among Turkey, Iran, Iraq and, to a
small extent, Syria. The one thing all of these countries have agreed
on historically is they have no desire to see an independent
Kurdistan. Even though each has,on occasion, used Kurdish dissidents
in other countries as levers against those countries, there always has
been a regional consensus against a Kurdish state.
Therefore, the news that Turkey is considering targeting the PKK is
part of the broader issue. The evolution of events in Iraq has
created an area that is now under the effective governance of the
Iraqi Kurds. Under most scenarios, the Iraqi Kurds will retain a high
degree of autonomy. Under some scenarios, the Kurds in Iraq could
become formally independent, creating aKurdish state. Besides facing
serious opposition from Iraq's Sunni and Shiite factions, that state
would be a direct threat to Turkey and Iran, since it would become, by
definition, the nucleus of a Kurdish state that would lay claimto
other lands the Kurds regard as theirs.
This is one of the reasons Turkey was unwilling to participate in the
U.S.
invasion of Iraq. The Americans grew close to the Kurds in Iraq during
Operation Desert Storm, helping augment the power of an independent
militia, the peshmerga, that allowed the Iraqi Kurds to carve out a
surprising degree of independence within Saddam Hussein's Iraq. The
Turks were never comfortable with this policy and sent troops into
Iraq in the 1990s to strike against the PKK and pre-empt any moves
toward more extensive autonomy. Before the war started in 2003,
however, the Turks turned down a U.S. offer to send troops into
northern Iraq in exchange for allowing the United States to use
Turkish territory to launch into Iraq. This refusal caused Turkey to
lose a great deal of its mobility in the region.
The Turks, therefore, are tremendously concerned by the evolution of
events in Iraq. Whether northern Iraq simply evolves into an
autonomous region ina federal Iraq or becomes an independent state as
Iraq disintegrates is almost immaterial. It will become a Kurdish
homeland and it will exist on the Turkish border. And that, from the
Turkish point of view, represents a strategic threat to Turkey.
Turkey, then, is flexing its muscles along the Iraqi border. Given
that Turkey did not participate in the 2003 invasion, the American
attitude toward Ankara has been complex, to say the least. On one
hand, there was a sense of being let down by an old ally. On the other
hand, given events in Iraq andU.S.
relations with Iran and Syria, the United States was not in a position
to completely alienate a Muslim neighbor of Iraq.
As time passed and the situation in Iraq worsened, the Americans
became even less able to isolate Turkey. That is partly because its
neutrality was important and partly because the United States was
extremely concerned about Turkish reactions to growing Kurdish
autonomy. For the Turks, this was a fundamental national security
issue. If they felt the situation were getting out of hand in the
Kurdish regions, they might well intervene militarily. At a time when
the Kurds comprised the only group in Iraq that was generally
pro-American, the United States could hardly let the Turks mangle
them.
On the other hand, the United States was hardly in a position to stop
the Turks. The last thing the United States wanted was a confrontation
with the Turks in the North, for military as well as political
reasons. Yet, the other last thing it wanted was for other Iraqis to
see that the United States would not protect them.
Stated differently, the United States had no solution to the
Turkish-Kurdish equation. So what the United States did was a tap
dance -- by negotiating a series of very temporary solutions that kept
the Turks from crossing the line and kept the Kurds intact. The
current crisis is over the status of the PKK in northern Iraq and, to
a great degree, over Turkish concerns that Iraqi Kurds will gain too
much autonomy, not to mention over concerns about the future status of
the oil-rich city of Kirkuk. The United States may well be ready to
support the Turks in rooting out PKK separatists, but it is not
prepared to force the Iraqi Kurds to give them up. So it will try to
persuade them to give them up voluntarily. This negotiating process
will buy time, though at this point the American strategy in Iraq
generally has been reduced to buying time.
All of this goes beyond the question of Iraq or an independent
Kurdistan.
The real question concerns the position of Turkey as a regional power
in the wake of the Iraq war. This is a vital question because of
Iran. The assumption we have consistently made is that, absent the
United States, Iran would become the dominant regional power and would
be in a position, in the longterm, to dominate the Arabian Peninsula,
shifting not only the regional balance of power but also potentially
the global balance as well.
That analysis assumes that Turkey will play the role it has played
since World War I -- an insular, defensive power that is cautious
about making alliances and then cautious within alliances. In that
role, Turkey is capable of limited assertiveness, as against the
Greeks in Cyprus, but is not inclined to become too deeply entangled
in the chaos of the Middle Eastern equation --and when it does become
involved, it is in the context of its alliance with the United States.
That is not Turkey's traditional role. Until the fall of the Ottomans
at the end of World War I, and for centuries before then, Turkey was
both the dominant Muslim power and a major power in North Africa,
Southeastern Europe and the Middle East. Turkey was the hub of a
multinational empire that as far back as the 15th century dominated
the Mediterranean and Black seas. It was the economic pivot of three
continents, facilitating and controlling the trading system of much of
the Eastern Hemisphere.
Turkey's contraction over the past 90 years or so is not the normal
pattern in the region, and had to do with the internal crisis in
Turkey since the fall of the Ottomans, the emergence of French and
British power in the Middle East, followed by American power and the
Cold War, which locked Turkey into place. During the Cold War, Turkey
was trapped between the Americans and Soviet s, and expansion of its
power was unthinkable. Since then, Turkey has been slowly emerging as
a key power.
One of the main drivers in this has been the significant growth of the
Turkish economy. In 2006, Turkey had the 18th highest gross domestic
product (GDP) in the world, and it has been growing at between 5
percent and 8 percent a year for more than five years. It ranks just
behind Belgium and ahead of Sweden in GDP. It has the largest economy
of any Muslim country -- including Saudi Arabia. And it has done this
in spite of, or perhaps because of, not having been admitted to the
European Union. While per capita GDP lags, it is total GDP that
measures weight in the international system. China, for example, is
109th in per capita GDP. Its international power rests on it being
fourth in total GDP.
Turkey is not China, but in becoming the largest Muslim economy, as
well as the largest economy in the eastern Mediterranean, Southeastern
Europe, the Middle East, the Caucasus and east to the Hindu Kush,
Turkey is moving to regain its traditional position of primacy in the
region. Its growth is still fragile and can be disrupted, but there is
no question that it has become the leading regional economy, as well
as one of the most dynamic. Additionally, Turkey's geographic position
greatly enables it to become Europe's primary transit hub for energy
supplies, especially at a time when Europe is trying to reduce its
dependence on Russia.
This obviously has increased its regional influence. In the Balkans,
for example, where Turkey historically has been a dominant power, the
Turks have again emerged as a major influence over the region's two
Muslim states -- and have managed to carve out for themselves a
prominent position as regards other countries in the region as
well. The country's economic dynamism has helped reorient some of the
region away from Europe, toward Turkey. Similarly, Turkish economic
influence can be felt elsewhere in the region, particularly as a
supplement to its strategic relationship with Israel.
Turkey's problem is that in every direction it faces, its economic
expansion is blocked by politico-military friction. So, for example,
its influence in the Balkans is blocked by its long-standing friction
with Greece. In the Caucasus, its friction with Armenia limits its
ability to influence events.
Tensions with Syria and Iraq block Syrian influence to the south. To
the east, a wary Iran that is ideologically opposed to Turkey blocks
Ankara's influence.
As Turkey grows, an interesting imbalance has to develop. The ability
of Greece, Armenia, Syria, Iraq and Iran to remain hostile to Turkey
decreases as the Turkish economy grows. Ideology and history are very
real things, but so is the economic power of a dynamic economy. As
important, Turkey's willingness to accept its highly constrained role
indefinitely, while its economic -- and therefore political --
influence grows, is limited. Turkey's economic power, coupled with its
substantial regional military power, will over time change the balance
of power in each of the regions Turkey faces.
Not only does Turkey interface with an extraordinary number of
regions, but its economy also is the major one in each of those
regions, while Turkish military power usually is pre-eminent as
well. When Turkey develops economically, it develops militarily. It
then becomes the leading power --in many regions. That is what it
means to be a pivotal power.
In 2003, the United States was cautious with Turkey, though in the
final analysis it was indifferent. It no longer can be
indifferent. The United States is now in the process of planning the
post-Iraq war era, and even if it does retain permanent bases in Iraq
-- dubious for a number of reasons -- it will have to have a regional
power to counterbalance Iran. Iran has always been aware of and
cautious with Turkey, but never as much as now -- while Turkey is
growing economically and doing the heavy lifting on the Kurds. Iran
does not want to antagonize the Turks.
The United States and Iran have been talking -- just recently engaging
in seven hours of _formal discussions_
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. But Iran, betting that the United States will withdraw from Iraq, is
not taking the talks as seriously as it might. The United States has
few levers to use against Iran. It is therefore not surprising that it
has reached out to the biggest lever.
In the short run, Turkey, if it works with the United States,
represents a counterweight to Iran, not only in general, but also
specifically in Iraq.
>From the American point of view, a Turkish invasion of northern Iraq
would introduce a major force native to the region that certainly
would give Iran pause in its behavior in Iraq. This would mean the
destruction of Kurdish hopes for independence, though the United
States has on several past occasions raised and then dashed Kurdish
hopes. In this sense, Novak's article makes a great deal of sense. The
PKK would provide a reasonable excuse for a Turkish intervention in
Iraq, both in the region and in Turkey. Anything that blocks the
Kurds will be acceptable to the Turkish public, and even to Iran.
It is the longer run that is becoming interesting, however. If the
United States is not going to continue counterbalancing Iran in the
region, then it is in Turkey's interest to do so. It also is
increasingly within Turkey's reach. But it must be understood that,
given geography, the growth of Turkish power will not be confined to
one direction. A powerful and self-confidentTurkey has a geographical
position that inevitably reflects all the regions that pivot around
it.
For the past 90 years, Turkey has not played its historic role. Now,
however, economic and politico-military indicators point to Turkey's
slow reclamation of that role. The rumors about Turkish action against
the PKK have much broader significance. They point to a changing role
for Turkey -- and thatwill mean massive regional changes over time.
© Copyright 2007 Strategic Forecasting Inc.
It's a custom of the human condition for the masses to remain ignorant. It's what they do. In fact, that IS how "the peace" is kept. Whatever democracy we have here is a spectator's sport.